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QUANTUM RANDOMNESS AND UNDERDETERMINATION
JEFFREY A. BARRETT AND SIMON M. HUTTEGGER
Abstract. We consider the nature of quantum randomness and how one
might have empirical evidence for it. We will see why, depending on one’s
computational resources, it may be impossible to determine whether a partic-
ular notion of randomness properly characterizes one’s empirical data. Indeed,
we will see why even an ideal observer under ideal epistemic conditions may
never have any empirical evidence whatsoever for believing that the results of
one’s quantum-mechanical experiments are randomly determined. This illus-
trates a radical sort of empirical underdetermination faced by fundamentally
stochastic theories like quantum mechanics.
1. quantum randomness
Randomness is a characteristic aspect of quantum phenomena. It is unclear,
however, what it should mean for the results of one’s quantum-mechanical measure-
ments to be randomly distributed. It is also unclear how one might have empirical
evidence for the randomness of one’s measurement results. Here we will use the the-
ory of algorithmic randomness to show how one might capture some of the standard
intuitions regarding what it might mean for the results of quantum measurements
to be randomly distributed. We will then see why one may never have any empirical
evidence whatsoever that the results of one’s quantum-mechanical experiments are
in fact randomly determined even on the assumption that one’s data is statistically
uniform. This illustrates a radical sort of empirical underdetermination faced by
fundamentally stochastic theories like quantum mechanics.
The argument is that once one is in the ballpark of capturing standard intu-
itions regarding what it might mean for the results of quantum measurements to
be random, one encounters competing notions of randomness that are different but
formally indistinguishable given standard computational resources. This point re-
garding the empirical indistinguishability of competing notions of randomness could
be made more abstractly. We are considering it in the concrete context of quantum
mechanics because here the truth of the physical theory depends on whether or not
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the physical world is in fact objectively random. To this end, we are interested
in notions of randomness where a physical process (as in a theory like the von
Neumann-Dirac collapse formulation of quantum mechanics) or initial distribution
(as in a theory like Bohmian mechanics) might be understood as being intrinsically
and objectively random. We take this to be what is required to make sense of how
physical randomness is typically understood in the context of quantum mechanics.
We will discuss this approach in contrast with other notions of randomness later.
In some formulations of quantum mechanics the source of quantum randomness
is dynamical. This is the case for the standard von Neumann-Dirac collapse theory
(1955) and more recent collapse theories like Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber (GRW)
(1986).1 In other formulations quantum randomness results from the specification
of special statistical boundary conditions. This is the case for some no-collapse
theories. In Bohmian mechanics (1952) quantum randomness can be thought of as
resulting from the random selection of an initial particle configuration relative to
the initial wave function.2 In other no-collapse formulations quantum randomness is
the result of epistemic uncertainty regarding self-location. This is the case for some
many-world reconstructions of Everett’s pure wave mechanics (1957).3 Here we will
consider quantum randomness in the context of the standard von Neumann-Dirac
formulation of quantum mechanics, but these considerations are also applicable to
other formulations of quantum mechanics that appeal to the notion of a random
process or random selection.
The standard von Neumann-Dirac collapse formulation of quantum mechanics
stipulates that one’s measurement results are the result of a random dynamical
process and, hence, predicts that a sequence of measurement results will be ran-
domly distributed.4 We will first consider the sense in which it predicts random
measurement results then consider how one might empirically test its predictions.
On the standard collapse formulation of quantum mechanics, the state of a phys-
ical system S is represented by an element |ψ〉S of unit length in a Hilbert space H,
and a physical observable O is represented by a Hermitian operator Oˆ on that
space. The physical interpretation of a state is given by the eigenvalue-eigenstate
link which says that a system S has a determinate value for observable O if and
only if it is in an eigenstate of O. That is, S has a determinate value for O if and
only if Oˆ|ψ〉S = λ|ψ〉S , where Oˆ is the Hermitian operator corresponding to O, |ψ〉S
1See Albert (1992) and Barrett (2019) for discussions.
2See Barrett (1999) and (2019) for discussions.
3See Saunders, Barrett, Kent, and Wallace (2010), Wallace (2012), and Barrett (2019) for discus-
sions.
4See Barrett (2019) for a discussion of the standard von Neumann-Dirac formulation of quantum
mechanics and its conceptual structure.
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is the vector representing the state of S, and the eigenvalue λ is a real number. In
this case, one would with certainty get the result λ if one measured O of S.
Given the eigenvalue-eigenstate link and the linear way that systems evolve when
they are not measured, a particular observable will typically fail to have any deter-
minate value at all for a given system before the system is measured. According
to the standard theory, the system acquires a determinate value for the observable
when it is measured. In particular, the theory predicts that when the observable
is measured, the system will instantaneously and randomly jump to an eigenstate
of the observable being measured with probabilities determined by its initial state.
Since the final state will be an eigenstate of the measured observable, it will be one
where the object system now has a determinate value for that observable. And,
salient to the present discussion, that value will be randomly determined by the
process that generated it.
In describing the dynamical laws of the standard theory, von Neumann referred
to the random nonlinear evolution of the state that occurs on measurement as
Process 1. When no one is observing the system, it evolves in a deterministic, linear
way that he called Process 2. These two dynamical laws might be characterized as
follows:
Process 1: If a measurement is made of the system S, the state
of S will randomly collapse to an eigenstate of the observable being
measured (a state where the system has a determinate value of the
observable being measured). If the initial state is given by |ψ〉S
and |χ〉S is an eigenstate of O, then the probability of S collapsing
to |χ〉S is equal to |〈ψ|χ〉|2 (the square of the magnitude of the
projection of the premeasurement state onto the eigenstate).
Process 2: If no measurement is made of a physical system, it will
evolve in a deterministic, linear way: if the state of S is given by
|ψ(t0)〉S at time t0, then its state at a time t will be given by
Uˆ(t0, t1)|ψ(t0)〉S , where Uˆ is a unitary operator that depends on
the energy properties of S.
Process 2 is a deterministic dynamical law that explains quantum-mechanical
interference and entanglement. In contrast, Process 1 is a fundamentally stochastic
dynamical law. It explains both why measurements yield determinate outcomes and
why one should expect a sequence of quantum measurement results to be randomly
distributed with the standard quantum statistics.
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That the theory does not say what constitutes a measurement means that it is
unclear precisely when each dynamical law obtains. This ambiguity is the source of
the quantum measurement problem.5 For present purposes, we will simply suppose
that Process 1 kicks in at some point during a measurement interaction to produce
determinate measurement records that are randomly determined with the standard
quantum statistics. Our concern here is not to say precisely when or why collapses
occur but rather to consider what it might mean to say that one’s measurement
records are randomly determined with the standard quantum statistics and how
one might have empirical evidence for such a claim.




Suppose that one measures the x-spin of each system in turn and records 0 for ↓x
and 1 for ↑x as a string σ. Call this the quantum coin-toss experiment.6 Here
Process 1 predicts that the outcome of each trial will be randomly determined with
probability 1/2 of recording 0 and probability 1/2 of recording 1 on each trial.
That is, or to say something that is at least very closely related, one expects with
probability one that the outcomes to be statistically independent and unbiased.7
While no particular sequence of 0’s and 1’s is ruled out in the quantum coin-
toss experiment, one would have very good empirical evidence against Process 1 if
the ratio of 0’s and 1’s in σ were not approximately even in the long run. If so,
the dynamics would be predicting the wrong relative frequencies. But one would
also have very good empirical evidence against Process 1 if the sequence of results
exhibited a simple pattern like 01010101 . . .. This would not count against the
dynamics predicting the right relative frequencies, but the longer a simple pattern
like this persists, the better one’s empirical evidence that the measurement results
are not statistically independent and hence not in fact determined by a random
process at all.
If Process 1 is descriptive of the physical world, then one should expect a sequence
of measurement results to exhibit all of the properties of a random sequence. One
such property in the present case is that a random sequence of measurement results
5See Albert (1992) and Barrett (1999) and (2019) for discussions of the quantum measurement
problem and various proposed resolutions.
6One might equivalently, according to the standard theory, alternate x-spin and z-spin measure-
ments on a single electron and keep track of the sequence of up and down results.
7There is an important distinction to be made between a random sequence and a sequence pro-
duced by a random process as these notions are typically used. While one would expect (with
probability one) a random sequence from a random process, and a random sequence is empirical
evidence that it was generated by a random process, it is possible for a random process to produce
a nonrandom sequence. But if a process does produce a nonrandom sequence, that clearly counts
as evidence against the process being random inasmuch as that would be extraordinarily unlikely
otherwise.
QUANTUM RANDOMNESS AND UNDERDETERMINATION 5
should be expected to have the standard quantum relative frequencies. But, as the
example of an alternating sequence of zeroes and ones illustrates, having the right
relative frequencies is not sufficient for the sequence of measurement results to be
randomly distributed. We expect the sequence to exhibit other statistical features
as well. That said, it is not immediately clear what these should be. In addition
to tracking relative frequencies, one needs an explicit test of all of the features
of a random sequence (whatever these may be) in order to check the empirical
predictions of Process 1.
The general methodological question here concerns how one might empirically
determine whether the output of a physical process is in fact random. Equipped
with a test for randomness, a good Bayesian might then seek to update her degree
of belief that the sequence σ was produced by a random process by conditioning
on new measurement results as one gets them. But what should it mean for the
results in σ, or an initial segment of σ, to be random?
As suggested earlier, our intuitions concerning what it means for a sequence
of results to be randomly distributed are closely tied to our intuitions concerning
what it means for those results to be statistically independent. The judgment that
the sequence 01010101 . . . does not appear to be random goes hand-in-hand with
the judgment that the measurement results that constitute it do not appear to be
statistically independent. In this sense, a test for statistical independence is a test
for a corresponding variety of randomness and the other way around.8 If Process 1
is in fact descriptive of the physical world, then one should expect the results of the
quantum coin-toss experiment to be both random and statistically independent in
some appropriately strong sense.
Von Neumann’s physical intuition was that the sequence σ should be expected
to be random and its elements statistically independent because it is determined by
a dynamical process that produces arbitrary events.9 Specifically, he understood
Process 1 to postulate a “willku¨rliche Vera¨nderung”—an arbitrary or capricious
change in the physical state. Because the sequence of measurement results is arbi-
trary, one expects it to be patternless and not special in any specifiable sense. The
arbitrary results of this process were, for von Neumann, what made the standard
quantum probabilities the most precise empirical predictions possible. He took the
quantum mechanical state to be complete. Further, salient for the issue at hand,
8Events A and B are statistically independent if and only if P (A) = P (A|B). The issue here is
how one tests whether of not this condition is satisfied by the dynamical process that produced
one’s results given those results.
9By expectation we mean expectation with probability one.
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he took Process 1 to be (1) a physical process and (2) dynamically complete—there
is simply nothing more to say about the result of a quantum measurement.10
As a consequence of von Neumann’s commitment to the outcomes being arbi-
trary, the sequence σ should be typical. That is, it should be a sequence that one
can think of as having been arbitrarily selected from a subset of measure one of all
possible sequences in Lebesgue measure just as in the case of the random outcomes
of tosses of a theoretical fair coin. This ties directly to statistical independence. If
the measurement results are independent, then one should also expect the sequence
to be typical (measure one) in Lebesgue measure.
Finally, concerning von Neumann’s commitment to state completeness and the
completeness of the dynamics, since the standard probabilistic predictions of quan-
tum mechanics are the most precise predictions possible, one should expect there
to be no fair betting strategy that would allow one to do better in predicting
the sequence σ than simply predicting each result with the standard quantum
probabilities—here each with probability 1/2.11
2. algorithmic randomness
In order to test the empirical predictions of the standard theory, then, we want
to test σ for being patternless in a way that satisfies our statistically-independent,
unpredictable, no-betting-strategy intuitions. In short, we want to ensure that the
sequence exhibits no specifiable regularity.
In this spirit, one might take a sequence to be patternless, and hence random,
when there is no algorithm significantly shorter than the sequence that produces
it. While this is a step in the right direction, it is not quite what we want. An
immediate problem is that an infinite sequence might be incompressible but still
contain long, recurring subsequences that exhibit regular patterns. In that case,
the sequence as a whole does not satisfy our intuitions regarding what it is to be
random.
Consider an infinite sequence that consists of one thousand 1’s followed by one
thousand 0’s followed by one thousand random 0’s and 1’s, then repeats this three-
block pattern forever. Because of the random blocks, such an infinite sequence
may be incompressible in the sense of not being representable by a finite-length
algorithm, but the full sequence is clearly not random. This is reflected by the fact
that there is a simple betting strategy that would lead to unbounded wealth in the
10See Wigner (1970, 1005-6 and endnote 1), Earman (1986, 227-8), and Barrett (2019) for more
on von Neumanns understanding of the essential nature of quantum unpredictability. See Earman
(1986, 199-234) for a discussion of the distinction between quantum indeterminism and quantum
unpredictability.
11A fair betting strategy is a plan to bet for or against outcomes at each stage so that one does
not expect to win or loose at the next stage. If one were to adopt an unfair betting strategy, one
could of course expect to win arbitrarily large amounts of money.
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long run (e.g. predict 1 a thousand times then 0 a thousand times then whatever
one wants a thousand times and repeat). The upshot is that this very simple notion
of algorithmic randomness is too weak to support the intuition that there should
be no pattern or betting strategy that allows one to predict better than chance.
But we are on the right track.
There are a number of more subtle notions of algorithmic randomness that
do support our patternless, statistically-independent, unpredictable, no-betting-
strategy intuitions. We will consider two here: Martin-Lo¨f randomness and Schnorr
randomness. Each of these satisfies the basic intuition that a random sequence
should be patternless in a way that makes it effectively unpredictable and, in a
strong sense, does not allow for a successful betting strategy.
Martin-Lo¨f and Schnorr randomness fit into a hierarchy of algorithmic ways of
understanding what it might mean for a sequence to be random. The core notions
of algorithmic randomness from less to more restrictive are Kurtz (weak) random,
Schnorr random, computably random, Martin-Lo¨f random, and 2-random. We are
concerned here with Schnorr randomness and Martin-Lo¨f randomness.12
A notion of randomness can be given in terms of a set of tests that a random
sequence will pass. A Martin-Lo¨f test is a sequence {Un}n∈ω of uniformly Σ01 sets
of sequences such that µ(Un) ≤ 2−n for all n, where µ is the unbiased Lebesgue
measure over the sequences. Being uniformly Σ01 means that there is a single con-
structive specification of the sequence of sets. A constructive specification can be
represented by a ordinary algorithm.13 Let 2ω be the set of all ω-length sequences
(infinite-length sequences indexed by ω). A sequence S ∈ 2ω passes the Martin-Lo¨f
test associated with the sequence {Un}n∈ω if and only if S is not in the measure zero
null set
⋂
n Un. Passing a Martin-Lo¨f test can be thought of as passing a particular
effective statistical test for randomness.14 A sequence is Martin-Lo¨f random if and
only if it passes every Martin-Lo¨f test. Since there are only a countable number of
Martin-Lo¨f tests, the union of all the associated null sets is also a set of measure
zero. So the set of Martin-Lo¨f random sequences has Lebesgue measure one.
The idea here is that each sequence {Un}n∈ω of uniformly Σ01 classes corresponds
to an effectively specifiable way that a sequence might be special and thus to an
associated statistical test of randomness. A sequence passes the test if it is not
special in the specified sense. A sequence is Martin-Lo¨f random then if (1) it is
12See Li and Paul Vita´nyi (2008) for an introduction to algorithmic complexity and randomness.
See Downey and Hirschfeldt (2010) for a description and comparison of Martin-Lo¨f and Schnorr
randomness and Downey and Griffiths (2002) for further details regarding the properties of Schnorr
randomness.
13Σ01 sets are semi-computable open sets in the following sense. Every Σ
0
1 is the union of a
countable set of cylinder sets, the clopens of Cantor space. By taking an increasing sequence of
finite unions of clopens, we can approximate each Σ01 set by computable objects from below.
14See Downey and Hirschfeldt (2010, 229–31) for an extended discussion.
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not special in any way that can be effectively specified and hence (2) it passes
every effective statistical test for being random. This is arguably precisely what
one should want for a sequence to be considered random.
Martin-Lo¨f randomness also supports the intuition that a random sequence
should be patternless in the sense of being both incompressible and unpredictable.
An infinite sequence is Martin-Lo¨f random if and only if there is a constant c such
that all finite initial segments are c-incompressible (not representable by an algo-
rithm that is c shorter than the initial segment) by a prefix-free machine (a universal
Turing machine that is self-delimiting and hence can read its input in one direction
without knowing what, if anything, comes next). And a sequence is Martin-Lo¨f
random if and only if no constructive martingale succeeds on it (if there is no con-
structive betting strategy that generates unbounded wealth).15 Since measure one
of infinite-length sequences are Martin-Lo¨f random in the unbiased Lebesgue mea-
sure over the set of possible sequences, it also supports the intuition that random
sequences are not special in a measure-theoretic sense.
The notion of a sequence being Schnorr random is closely related. A Schnorr
test is a Martin-Lo¨f test where the measures µ(Un) on the sequence of uniformly
Σ01 sets are uniformly computable (there is a single algorithm that computes each
of these measures). A sequence S ∈ 2ω passes the Schnorr test associated with the
sequence {Un}n∈ω if and only if S is not in the measure zero null set
⋂
n Un. A
sequence is Schnorr random if and only if it passes every Schnorr test. Because
the measures on the test classes µ(Un) are uniformly computable, the statistical
tests here might be thought of as being more concretely specifiable than in the case
of Martin-Lo¨f randomness. Indeed, one can suppose that the measures of the test
classes are given by µ(Un) = 2
−n without loss of generality.
The notion of Schnorr randomness, like that of Martin-Lo¨f randomness, captures
the intuition that a random sequence should be patternless in the sense of being
both incompressible and unpredictable in a strong sense. An infinite sequence is
Schnorr random if and only if there is a constant c such that all finite initial seg-
ments are c-incompressible by a computable measure machine (a prefix-free Turing
machine with a domain of computable measure).16 If a sequence is Schnorr ran-
dom, then no computable martingale h-succeeds on it (there is no computable
betting strategy that generates wealth over time that is bounded from below by an
unbounded, nondecreasing function h).17 And, like Martin-Lo¨f random sequences,
Schnorr random sequences are not special—measure one of infinite-length sequences
are Schnorr random.
15Constructive again means computably approximable from below.
16See Downey and Hirschfeldt (2010, 277) for further details on such machines.
17See Downey and Hirschfeldt (2010, 271) for further details regarding the martingale properties
of Schnorr random sequences.
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Important for what follows, Martin-Lo¨f random (MLR) infinite-length sequences
are a proper subset of Schnorr random (SR) sequences. Since MLR sequences and
SR sequences are both measure-one sets, their intersection is also measure one.
And the set of sequences that are SR but not MLR is measure zero in the unbiased
Lebesgue measure over the set of infinite-length sequences. Sequences that are SR
but not MLR are measure-theoretically very special.
3. the effective indeterminacy of randomness and independence
Given how they support the relevant intuitions, both Martin-Lo¨f random and
Schnorr random provide plausible standards for quantum randomness. Indeed,
inasmuch as random sequences are not special, one would expect (with probability
one) the sequence σ of quantum-mechanical results produced by Process 1 to be
both Martin-Lo¨f random and Schnorr random. But here one encounters a number
of epistemic problems.
Consider the following proposition concerning whether one can know whether a
sequence is Martin-Lo¨f random or Schnorr random.18
Proposition 3.1. Suppose that C ⊆ 2ω is a non-empty class such that either (i) C
contains no computable members, or (ii) C 6= 2ω and C is a tailset, i.e. if X is in
C and Y differs from X by at most finitely many bits, then Y is in C. Then there
is no algorithm e such that for all X ∈ 2ω one has ϕXe (0) = 1 iff X ∈ C, where ϕXe
denotes the e−th computable function with oracle X.
Proof. Suppose not, with witness e. Since C is a non-empty class, choose X in C.
Then ϕXe (0) = 1. Then there is s such that ϕ
X
e,s(0) = 1, that is, the computation
converges in < s steps looking at < s bits of the oracle tape.
Let σ = X  s. Suppose that (i) is satisfied. Consider Y = σ_0, i.e. σ followed
by all zero’s. This is computable and we also have that ϕYe,s(0) = 1 and hence
Y ∈ C, contradicting our hypothesis that C contains no computable members.
Suppose that (ii) is satisfied. Then for any Y ∈ [σ], that is, any Y which begins
with σ, we have Y ∈ C. But every element of 2ω differs by an element of [σ] by
only finitely much, and since C is a tailset, we then have C = 2ω. 
Notions of algorithmic randomness typically satisfy both conditions (i) and (ii).
In particular, both Martin-Lo¨f and Schnorr randomness satisfy these two conditions.
The upshot is that there is no effective procedure to tell whether a sequence σ is
Martin-Lo¨f random or Schnorr random. This means that if one is restricted to
18See Soare (2016) for an explanation of the notation here. The proof of this proposition follows
closely from the definitions of the relevant notions. See, for example, Soare (2016, 190) and Shen
et al. (2017, 81). See also Downey and Hirschfeldt’s (2010, 16–8) discussion of the use principle.
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Turing-strength computations, one can never know whether one’s empirical evi-
dence is in fact random in either of these two senses.19 But the epistemic situation
is significantly worse than this might suggest.
The following proposition is concerned with the question of whether one can
distinguish between sequences that are Schnorr random but not Martin-Lo¨f random
and sequences that are Martin Lo¨f random.
Proposition 3.2. There is no algorithm e such that for all X ∈ 2ω, if one has
that if X is Schnorr random, then ϕXe (0) = 1 iff X is Martin-Lo¨f random.
Proof. Choose Martin-Lo¨f random X. Then as above, ϕXe,s(0) = 1 for some s, and
again set σ = X  s. Choose Y which is Schnorr random but not Martin-Lo¨f random
and let Z = σ_Y . Then since the Schnorr randoms and the Martin-Lo¨f randoms
are tail sets, one has that Z is Schnorr random but not Martin-Lo¨f random. But
we also have that ϕZe (0) = 1 since Z ∈ [σ]. 
The upshot is that there is no effective procedure that would tell whether a
particular sequence is Martin Lo¨f random or Schnorr random but not Martin-Lo¨f
random.
In order to make clear what is at stake here, consider two ways of understand-
ing what it might mean for the sequence of results σ in the quantum coin-toss
experiment to be randomly determined dynamically.
Martin-Lo¨f dynamics: When a measurement is made of system Sk,
its state instantaneously jumps to an eigenstate of the observable
being measured in such a way that the sequence of results σ should
be expected almost always to be MLR.
Schnorr dynamics: When a measurement is made of system Sk,
its state instantaneously jumps to an eigenstate of the observable
being measured in such a way that the sequence of results σ should
be expected almost always to be SR.
Given proposition ??, there is a sense in which these two dynamical laws are ef-
fectively indistinguishable, but the Martin-Lo¨f dynamics is in fact more restrictive
19There are similar results to this for other notions of randomness. Notably, Eagle (2005) points
out that one cannot tell from any finite initial segment of a sequence that it is von Mises random
if it is. He concludes that von Mises randomness “is a profligate hypothesis that we cannot
be justified in adopting” even for infinite strings of quantum-mechanical measurement outcomes
(2005, 757-8). Eagle suggests Martin-Lo¨f randomness as an improvement on von Mises’ notion.
But, given the sequence of arguments here, he would presumably take Martin-Lo¨f randomness
and Schnorr randomness to be similarly profligate, especially when, as we will see, there is a sense
in which empirical underdetermination holds here even in the limit as one examines the entire
sequence. In contrast, we take both of these notions to be in the ballpark of the physical intuitions
involved in quantum randomness. We will discuss Eagle’s approach to randomness later.
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from a god’s-eye-view than the Schnorr dynamics. This difference would only be
detectable by a computationally strong observer, one who could carry out compu-
tations that go beyond what can be accomplished by an ordinary Turing machine.
But such an observer might find herself with very strong empirical evidence for
accepting the Schnorr dynamics over the Martin-Lo¨f dynamics.
Suppose that one somehow knew that the sequence of results σ was SR but
not MLR. Since one would expect σ to be both SR and MLR on the Martin-Lo¨f
dynamics, this would count as very strong evidence in favor of the Schnorr dynamics
over the Martin-Lo¨f dynamics. This is precisely analogous to the argument that
getting something from the measure-zero set of sequences that can be represented by
finite algorithms would provide strong empirical evidence that the actual physical
dynamics was not random at all.
That said, if the Schnorr dynamics were in fact descriptive of the world, while
such a sequence of results is possible, one would never expect a sequence that was
SR but not MLR. Rather, one would fully expect σ to be both MLR and SR on both
the Martin-Lo¨f dynamics and the Schnorr dynamics. Inasmuch the two laws yield
precisely the same expectations, there is good reason to take them to be empirically
equivalent even after one concedes that it is logically possible for an observer to have
evidence in favor of one over the other and a computationally strong observer to
recognize the difference.
But to see why this does not settle the matter, consider the following nonstandard
law.
Nonstandard dynamics: When a measurement is made of the sys-
tem Sk, its state instantaneously jumps to an eigenstate of the
observable being measured in such a way that the sequence of re-
sults σ should be expected almost always to be SR but not MLR.
Since one should expect this dynamics to produce a sequence of measurement out-
comes that is Schnorr random, one should expect it to produce a sequence that
appears to be perfectly random in the Schnorr sense of not exhibiting any effec-
tively specifiable or discernible pattern. Among other things, this means that one
should expect all initial segments of the sequence of measurement results to ap-
pear to be completely arbitrary and patternless in every algorithmically specifiable
sense. But inasmuch as one should expect the full sequence to be SR but not MLR,
one should expect that it will be selected from a measure-zero set of infinite-length
sequences. So while this dynamics produces sequences whose initial segments will
always appear to be entirely patternless and unpredictable and will pass all effec-
tive statistical tests for being random, a sequence chosen from a measure zero set
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is in a straightforward sense very special and, hence, is not at all random in the
measure-theoretic sense. While the sequence of measurement results will appear to
be randomly determined on the nonstandard dynamics, it isn’t.
Similarly, while one should expect results produced by the nonstandard dynamics
to appear to be statistically independent, they aren’t. If the results were in fact
statistically independent, then the sequence should be expected to be arbitrarily
chosen from the measure-one set of all possible infinite-length sequences, not from
the measure-zero set of sequences that are SR but not MLR. Hence, the sequence
of results produced by the nonstandard dynamics is not random in the sense of in
fact being statistically independent.20
While the nonstandard dynamics represents a simple, concrete law that an in-
quirer might seriously consider given standard deliberational resources, it threatens
a strong variety of empirical underdetermination. Since there is no effective pro-
cedure that would distinguish between a sequence that is both SR and MLR from
one that is SR but not MLR, the nonstandard dynamics is empirically equivalent to
the Martin-Lo¨f dynamics given standard computational resources. But inasmuch
as one should expect the Martin-Lo¨f dynamics to be empirically indistinguishable
from Process 1, the nonstandard dynamics is empirically equivalent to Process 1
if one is restricted to standard computational resources. Indeed, it is empirically
equivalent to any standard criterion of randomness that assigns Lebesgue measure-
one to the set of random sequences. The upshot is that if the sequence of quantum
results σ are in fact random in any standard sense, then there is no effective way
to rule out the nonstandard dynamics regardless of how much empirical evidence
one has.
The epistemic situation here is dire. There is a straightforward sense in which one
can never have any empirical evidence whatsoever that one’s quantum-mechanical
results are in fact randomly determined or genuinely independent if they are. In
order to see why, compare what it would be to have empirical evidence regarding
the relative frequencies of one’s results against what it would be to have empirical
evidence regarding the randomness of one’s results.
A good Bayesian inquirer might have empirical evidence either for or against
quantum mechanics predicting the right relative frequencies by conditioning on
the evidence presented in each initial segment σk of σ on the assumption that the
sequence exhibits an appropriate sort of statistical uniformity. But there is no way
at all to distinguish between the initial segments of sequences that are both SR and
MLR and those that are SR but not MLR. This is because c-incompressible on a
20If one were to repeat the full quantum coin-toss experiment and keep getting sequences in the
gap between SR and MLR, then from a god’s-eye-view one would have evidence for a very subtle
sort of global statistical dependence—a sort that one could not concretely characterize by effective
means.
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prefix-free machine (the condition for being MLR) is precisely the same thing as
c-incompressible on a computable measure machine (the condition for being SR)
for any finite initial segment of the sequence. Sequences that are both SR and
MLR and those that are SR but not MLR will both always appear to be completely
random, patternless, statistically independent, and unpredictable.
Further, because the conditions are identical for all finite initial segments, no
background assumption of uniformity for the full sequence will help a Bayesian
inquirer to distinguish between sequences that are both SR and MLR (and hence
genuinely random) and those that are SR but not MLR and hence not what one
would expect from a random process. The point here is not that the inquirer will
never know with certainty whether the sequence was randomly determined. Rather,
even with a background assumption that the string is overall statistically uniform,
looking at finite initial segments here provides no evidence whatsoever that the
sequence was in fact randomly determined.
Put another way, while the examination of initial segments might provide a
Bayesian inquirer with compelling evidence that a given sequence is or is not simply
patterned in a concrete specified way (as in the case of the alternating pattern
exhibited by the sequence 01010101 . . .), a sequence that is SR but not MLR has a
global property that cannot be detected by examining initial segments. A sequence
generated by the nonstandard dynamics should be expected to exhibit this global
property, one shared by measure-zero of the possible infinite-length sequences. Such
sequences are very special. But the fact that they are special is not detectable from
finite initial segments.
While a good Bayesian is not committed to any particular set of priors as being
rational, on the standard line at least, she is committed to probabilistic coherence
and non-dogmatic priors. The first condition allows her to avoid dutch books and
the second provides a general path to learning the truth. If a Bayesian inquirer
were ever to assign a probability of zero or one to a hypothesis under consideration,
she would never be able to condition away from the initial dogmatic assignment
and hence would be entirely insensitive to new evidence no matter how strong.
While she might assign a very low prior probability to the hypothesis that the
evidence is SR but not MLR, inasmuch as she is interested in the truth, she cannot
assign a probability of zero. But, once on the table, she would never have empirical
evidence that supports both SR and MLR over SR but not MLR if she is restricted
to standard computational resources.
That a good Bayesian agent may have evidence regarding limiting relative fre-
quencies illustrates that the epistemic problem here is not the standard problem
of induction. Even when an agent has full empirical information in the form of
the complete infinite-length sequence σ, she can have no empirical evidence at all
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regarding whether σ is both SR and MLR (and hence statistically compatible with
any standard notion of randomness) or SR but not MLR (and hence statistically in-
compatible with all standard notions of randomness) given standard computational
resources.
4. discussion
The argument here concerns both the objective nature of the physical world and
what we can know about it. A theory that says that a process is random in a par-
ticular sense can only be true if the process is in fact random in the sense specified.
That said, the claim is not that quantum randomness is in fact faithfully described
by any particular notion of algorithmic randomness that we have discussed. We can
think of no reason whatsoever to suppose that quantum randomness as exhibited
in the physical world is precisely characterized by SR but not MLR or by the signif-
icantly more plausible notions of Schnorr randomness or Martin-Lo¨f randomness.
These notions of randomness are defined in terms of our basic understanding of for-
mal computability, and there is no grounds for believing that physical law respects
that. Rather, the argument is that objective standards of randomness that are in
the ballpark of capturing the properties that we expect from the random results of
the quantum coin-flip experiment, notions like SR and MLR, are subtle enough as
to be computationally (and hence empirically) indistinguishable. Further, in the
case of SR but not MLR, we see how one might have a notion of randomness that
one expects will select sequences from a measure zero subset of possible sequences,
and hence violate a basic commitment concerning the nature of objectively random
quantum processes (namely, that they select typical sequences), yet is nevertheless
computationally indistinguishable from other standards of randomness that are in
the ballpark of capturing the properties that we expect from the random measure-
ment results. The upshot is that we cannot empirically distinguish between very
different dynamical laws by standard computational means.
Among the consequences of quantum mechanics is presumably the claim that
the quantum coin-toss experiment in fact models an objectively random fair coin
and hence selects a typical sequence in the Lebesgue measure-one sense from the
set of all possible sequences. In something like the standard collapse formulation
of quantum mechanics, the truth of a dynamical law of nature is at stake—the
dynamics of the world is either such that one should expect ones results to be
randomly distributed in a particular specified way or they are not. More concretely,
most physicists would presumably expect the actual results of a quantum coin toss
to be at minimum Schnorr random and very probably also Martin-Lo¨f random if
they were to consider the question. As we have seen, both of these notions capture
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what it means for a sequence to be patternless and unpredictable and they satisfy
the measure-one typicality intuition regarding what it means to be a fair coin.
Of course, the point concerning the objectivity of quantum randomness also
applies in the context of a deterministic hidden-variable theory like Bohmian me-
chanics. Here there is a physical matter of fact at stake concerning whether particles
are in fact randomly distributed in a particular specified sense with respect to the
wave function at a time. If they are, then the results of the quantum-coin toss ex-
periment should be expected to be randomly distributed in a corresponding sense;
otherwise, all bets are off.
One strategy for avoiding the empirical underdetermination of quantum random-
ness would be to appeal to a different notion of what it means for a process to be
random. Antony Eagle (2005) has argued that randomness might be understood
as just unpredictability for a specified predictor. While the algorithmic notions of
randomness that we have considered are grounded in the martingale idea that a
random sequence should be unpredictable at a specified level of computation, his
proposal is more practically-minded. Specifically, Eagle takes an event E to be ran-
dom for a predictor P with a theory T if and only if P s posterior probability of E
conditional on T and her current evidence, is equal to her prior probability of E.
The idea is that the event is random if and only if a human agent P cannot in fact
make better predictions given her evidence of the current state than she could with
just her theory. Eagle wants a notion of randomness that takes into account the
fact that real predictors are severely limited in their epistemic and computational
capacities. He takes his account of randomness to be objective in the sense that it
is based on the objective features of real predictive agents.
Shifting to a notion of randomness like this would arguably allow one to have
straightforward evidence regarding the randomness of quantum events relative, say,
to the actual community of physicists given their de facto epistemic capabilities.
The results of the quantum coin toss experiment are random on this view if and only
if the physical community can do no better than predicting the standard quantum
probabilities. Since this has repeatedly proven to be the case, we have substantial
empirical evidence for the randomness of quantum measurement results relative
to the actual physics community over its recent history given its formulation of
quantum mechanics and its epistemic access to facts about the physical world.
Such a notion of randomness makes quantum randomness a property that de-
pends on the contingent practical properties of human agents rather than an ob-
jective intrinsic property of the physical world. Inasmuch as one is concerned with
determining whether quantum mechanics has the physical world right, the question
is not one whether the community of physicists up to now has been able to make
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predictions better than quantum mechanics allows when they use quantum mechan-
ics; rather, it is whether quantum mechanics is right in characterizing the collapse
as being a fundamentally random physical process in the context of something like
the standard collapse theory or of the initial distribution of particles being gen-
uinely random in the context of something like Bohmian mechanics. The question
is whether the physical world is in fact random in a concrete sense that supports the
descriptions of our best physical theories. Also salient here, the expected measure-
theoretic properties of random quantum sequences seem to be an essential part of
our theoretical commitments. In the case of the quantum coin-flip experiment, the
question is whether the sequence of results can be expected to be typical—that is,
selected in an unconstrained way from a Lebesgue measure-one subset of the set of
all sequences. This reflects von Neumann’s theoretical commitment to the results
being arbitrary and capricious.21
Notions of algorithmic randomness allow us to consider predictors with compu-
tational abilities that outstrip our current, contingent abilities. This allows us to
specify part of the standard commitments of physicists with respect to quantum
mechanics. Namely, those commitments that outstrip our historically contingent
capacities to predict. But, as we have seen, this comes with a trade-off—the tools
of algorithmic randomness allow us to specify notions of randomness that outstrip
our ability to determine whether they in fact obtain.
5. epistemic morals
We have seen how one might simply characterize a set of sequences (those that
are SR but not MLR) where each will always appear to be patternless and will
be empirically indistinguishable from a standard measure-one notion of random-
ness like Martin-Lo¨f random given computable resources. If nature were always
to produce sequences drawn from this measure-zero set, the quantum world would
not be random, but one could never know this by effective means. Indeed, as we
have seen, there is a sense in which one could never have any empirical evidence
at all for accepting the standard random dynamics if one were ever to allow for
the possibility of something like the nonstandard dynamics obtaining. And it is
unclear the rational grounds on which one might rule out this entirely straightfor-
ward possibility—a possibility that might easily be tested if one had nonstandard
computational resources of sufficient strength.
21While von Neumann was committed to quantum mechanics being indeterministic, it is worth
noting that algorithmic notions of randomness are compatible with determinism. As a simple
example, given the right sort of initial distribution of particles, the quantum world may be de-
terministic as described by Bohmian mechanics and yet still yield results that are expected to be
Martin-Lo¨f random.
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This leaves us with a sort of empirical underdetermination that results from
computational limits and not from any lack of empirical evidence. Even with the
complete set of empirical evidence, full Turing computational power, and the as-
sumption that one’s data is statistically uniform, there is a clear sense in which
one can have no empirical justification whatsoever for believing that the results of
one’s quantum-mechanical experiments are arbitrarily, independently, or randomly
determined.
The practice of science often involves theoretical commitments that extend be-
yond our predictive capacities. These might concern the early energy density of
the universe or the continuity of spacetime or the expected properties of infinite
sequences of quantum coin flips. Such idealized commitments often help us in for-
mulating, reasoning about, and communicating the content of our physical theories.
But they do so at the cost of committing us to claims that may not be empirically
testable given our actual empirical and computational capabilities.22
In the present case, if one is limited to computable resources, there is no em-
pirical content to insisting that quantum-mechanical results are genuinely random,
arbitrary, independent, and/or patternless. While one might be fully committed to
their being randomly determined given one’s intuitions regarding dynamical sim-
plicity or naturalness, one can have no empirical evidence for so believing.
22Different ways of modeling such idealized commitments can also matter to the empirical testa-
bility of scientific theories. This is discussed in the context of nonstandard probability theory in
Huttegger (2019).
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